Faculty Directory
Jason D. Hartline

Professor of Computer Science


2233 Tech Drive
Mudd Room 3015
Evanston, IL 60208-3109

847-467-0280Email Jason Hartline


Jason Hartline's Homepage

Theory Group

Economics Group


Computer Science

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Ph.D. Computer Science, University of Washington, Seattle, WA

M.S. Computer Science, University of Washington, Seattle, WA

B.S. Computer Science, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY

B.S. Electrical Engineering, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY

Research Interests

Prof. Hartline's research introduces design and analysis methodologies
from computer science to understand and improve outcomes of economic
systems.  Optimal behavior and outcomes in complex environments are
complex and, therefore, should not be expected; instead, the theory of
approximation can show that simple and natural behaviors are
approximately optimal in complex environments.  This approach is
applied to auction theory and mechanism design in his graduate
textbook Mechanism Design and Approximation
(http://www.jasonhartline.com/MDnA/) which is under preparation.

Selected Publications

  • Jason D Hartline, Aleck Johnsen, Denis Nekipelov, Onno Zoeter, “Dashboard mechanisms for online marketplaces?”, ACM EC 2019 - Proceedings of the 2019 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, (2019)
  • Jason D Hartline, Samuel Taggart, “Sample complexity for non-truthful mechanisms?”, ACM EC 2019 - Proceedings of the 2019 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, (2019)
  • Yiding Feng, Jason D Hartline, “An end-to-end argument in mechanism design (Prior-independent auctions for budgeted agents)”, Proceedings - 59th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, FOCS 2018, (2018)
  • Saeed Alaei, Jason D Hartline, Rad Niazadeh, Emmanouil Pountourakis, Yang Yuan, “Optimal auctions vs. anonymous pricing”, Games and Economic Behavior, (2018)
  • Shaddin Dughmi, Jason D. Hartline, Robert Kleinberg, Rad Niazadeh, “Bernoulli factories and black-box reductions in mechanism design”, STOC 2017 - Proceedings of the 49th Annual ACM SIGACT Symposium on Theory of Computing, (2017)
  • Jason D. Hartline, Brendan Lucier, “Non-optimal mechanism design”, American Economic Review, (2015)
  • Hartline, Jason D.; Devanur, Nikhil R.; Yan, Qiqi, “Envy freedom and prior-free mechanism design”, Journal of Economic Theory, (2015)